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STRATE V. A-1 CONTRACTORS: INTRUSION INTO THE
SOVEREIGN DOMAIN OF NATIVE NATIONS*
WAMBDI AWANWICAKE WASTEWIN*
With the decision in Strate v. A-i Contractors, the United States
Supreme Court overstepped the bounds of the government-to-govern-
ment relationship between Tribal nations and the United States. 2 The
Strate decision follows a recent trend in the Supreme Court's decisions
of judicial activism in terms of federal Indian law, and also signals a
return to former anti-Indian underpinnings in its decisions of. the early
1900s. 3 This article will examine: Part I, the legal background of the
Strate v. A-i Contractors decision; Part II, the Strate v. A-i Contractors
decision by the United States Supreme Court; Part III, the inherent
sovereignty of Tribal nations and the conflicts with the Strate decision;
and Part IV, the pragmatic future impact of the Strate decision on the
exercise of tribal jurisdiction.
* This article is dedicated to two women who have greatly influenced my life. First, it is
dedicated to Dorreen Yellow Bird, Arikara Nation, who held open the doors of law school so that I
might walk through. She sets an example as a Native woman dedicated to making the lives of Native
people better in everything that she does. Also, it is dedicated to Lisa Lone Fight, Arikara, Hidatsa,
and Mandan Nations, who has inspired me by her example as a Native woman embodying all of the
strength, compassion, commitment, and integrity of her nations. Finally, I would like to give special
thanks to Diane Avery, Tribal Attorney for the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold
Reservation, for her encouragement and support throughout the writing of this article.
** The author is a member of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota Nation of the Lake Traverse
Reservation. She received a Juris Doctor from the University of North Dakota School of Law in 1998
and a degree in Political Science from Stanford University in 1993.
i. 117 S. Ct. 1404(1997).
2. See Janet Reno, A Federal Commitment to Tribal Justice Systems, JUDICATURE, Nov.-Dec.
1995, at 113. "In April of 1994, President Bill Clinton reinforced the longstanding federal policy
supporting a substantial degree of self-determination for Indian [T]ribes. Federal agencies were
directed to deal with Indian [T]ribes on a government-to-government basis when tribal governmental
or treaty rights are at issue. " Id.
3. See David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the
Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1574-75 (1996).
Over the last fifteen years, partly as a result of [T]ribes' broader assertions of power
over reservation activity, non-Indian interests have been allowed to play a greater role in
Indian country jurisdictional disputes. As these disputes have reached the United States
Supreme Court, several decisions have curtailed exercises of tribal governing power that
cast a cultural shadow on non-Indian values, personal liberties, or property interests.
The Court has become the arbiter of how much governing authority [T]ribes may
exercise, assuming a prerogative that it formerly conceded to the political branches of
government.
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I. LEGAL BACKGROUND: STRATE V. A-] CONTRACTORS
A. FACTS
On November 9, 1990, a gravel truck driven by Lyle Stockert, an
employee of A-1 Contractors, collided with a small car driven by Gisela
Fredericks on North Dakota Highway Eight 4 within the Fort Berthold
Indian Reservation. 5 The Fort Berthold Indian Reservation is home to
the Three Affiliated Tribes composed of the Mandan, Hidatsa, and
Arikara Nations. 6  Mrs. Fredericks was not a member of the Tribes.
However, she was closely related to the Tribes due to her marriage to an
enrolled member and the enrollment of her five sons in the Tribes. 7 She
also continued to reside on the allotment belonging to her husband
following his death. 8 As a result of the car accident, Mrs. Fredericks was
seriously injured and hospitalized for twenty-four days. 9 Lyle Stockert,
at the time of the accident, was employed by A-1 Contractors and was
driving a company truck. 10 A-1 Contractors had entered into a
subcontract for construction work with a wholly owned tribal
corporation, LCM, to provide services for a new community building in
the Twin Buttes district of the reservation.l
B. LOWER COURT RULINGS: TRIAL COURT, NORTHERN PLAINS
INTERTRIBAL COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT PANEL, EIGHTH
CIRCUIT EN BANC REHEARING
Mrs. Fredericks proceeded to file suit in the Three Affiliated
Tribes' Tribal court against A-1 Contractors, Lyle Stockert, and Conti-
nental Western Insurance Co., 12 and claimed $1,000,000 for personal
4. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (No. 95-1872).
Highway 8 enters the southern boundary of the Reservation several miles south of Twin
Buttes. The authority for Highway 8 to enter the Reservation is an easement granted by
the Bureau of Indian Affairs to the North Dakota Highway Department on May 8, 1970
pursuant to 25 U.S.C. §§ 323-28. On the Reservation, Highway 8 crosses 6.59 miles of
Indian trust land before it ends at the shores of Lake Sakakawea. Highway 8 does not
cross any non-trust land within the Reservation.
Id.
5. A-I Contractors v. Strate, 76 F.3d 930, 932 (8 th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 518 U.S. 1056
(1996).
6. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Strate (No. 95-1872).
7. A-I Contractors, 76 F.3d at 932.
8. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Strate (No. 95-1872).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. A-I Contractors, 76 F.3d at 933. "Continental Western was dismissed from the case without
prejudice pursuant to an agreement of the parties." Id.
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injuries and medical expenses. 13 Her sons also sought damages for loss
of consortium. 14 The defendants' 5 made a special appearance in Tribal
Court to contest the Tribal Court's personal and subject matter jurisdic-
tion over the action and moved to dismiss the suit.16
The motion was denied with the Tribal Court finding that it had
adequate grounds for personal jurisdiction over Mrs. Fredericks, as a resi-
dent of the reservation, and over Lyle Stockert, as an employee of A-1
Contractors engaged in business within the reservation's boundaries.17
The Tribal Court "concluded that A-I Contractors failed to identify any
federal law, treaty provision or provisions of the United States consti-
tution which would preclude exercise of jurisdiction by the Tribal
Court." 18 On appeal to the Northern Plains Intertribal Court of Appeals,
the jurisdiction of the Three Affiliated Tribes' Tribal Court was affirmed
and the case was remanded for further proceedings.19
In response, defendants, A-i Contractors and Lyle Stockert, filed
for declaratory and injunctive relief from the exercise of Tribal Court
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 133120 in the federal district court for
13. Brief of Petitioner at 4, Strate (No. 95-1872).
14. Id.
15. Lyle Stockert, A-I Contractors, and Continental Western were the defendants in the suit
before the Tribal Court.
16. A-I Contractors, 76 F.3d at 933.
17. Id.
18. A-1 Contractors v. Strate, No. 95-1872, 1992 WL 696330, at 1 (D. N.D. Sept. 16, 1992).
"The applicable tribal code provisions are as follows:
Chapter 1, Section 3: Jurisdiction of the Courts
Subsection 3.2-Jurisdiction-Territorial
The jurisdiction of the court shall extend to any and all lands and territory within the
Reservation boundaries, including all easements, fee patented lands, rights of way; and
over land outside the Reservation boundaries held in trust for Tribal members or the
Tribe;
Subsection 3.3-Jurisdiction-Personal
Subject to any limitations or restrictions imposed by the Constitution or the law of the
United States, the Court shall have civil and criminal jurisdiction over all persons who
reside, enter, or transact business within the territorial boundaries of the reservation;
provided that criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians shall extend as permitted by case
law;
Subsection 3.5-Jurisdiction-Subject Matter
The Court shall have jurisdiction over all civil causes of action arising within the exterior
boundaries of the Reservation, and over all criminal offenses which are enumerated in
this Code, and which are committed within the exterior boundaries of the Reservation.
Chapter 2, Section 3(f): Long Arm Statute. Any person subject to the jurisdiction of the
Tribal Court during any of the following acts:
1) The transaction of any business of the Reservation;
2) The commission of any act which results in accrual of a tort action within the
Reservation;
3) The ownership, use or possession of any property, or any interest therein, situated
with in the Reservation."
Id. at 4-5.
19. Brief for Petitioners at 4, Strate (No. 95-1872).
20. Id. "Federal question jurisdiction provides: 'The district courts shall have original jurisdic
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North Dakota.21 The district court found that it had jurisdiction "under
28 U.S.C. § 1331, to determine the extent of Tribal Court jurisdiction
since A-1 has exhausted Tribal Court remedies pursuant to the rule in
National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985)."2 2
The district court held that under the Tribal Code, the Tribal Court had
correctly exercised both personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the
tort action at issue and denied the relief requested. 23
An appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
where a three judge panel reviewed the district court's judgment de no-
vo. 24 The Eighth Circuit panel stated that "the question of tribal court
jurisdiction is a question of federal law which we review de novo." 25
The panel affirmed 26 the district court's ruling and distinguished the
Montana v. United States case on its face limiting Tribal jurisdiction
over non-Indians for regulatory purposes only on fee lands. 27 A-i
Contractors had asserted that the Montana decision was applicable to the
tort action and required a showing that Tribal jurisdiction had not been
divested through treaty or act of Congress for the Tribal Court to have
jurisdiction over non-Indians. 28 The panel considered, for the sake of
argument, the applicability of Montana and found that if it were applied,
the Tribal Court would still have jurisdiction over the instant tort
action. 29 Circuit Judge Hansen, dissenting, found Montana applicable
and emphasized the requirement that an overriding tribal interest must
be asserted prior to the Tribal Court establishing jurisdiction over non-
Indians within the territorial boundaries of the reservation. 30
The Eighth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc31 of the panel's
determination with Circuit Judge Hansen authoring the opinion which
reversed the panel. 32 The decision began with the assertion that Mon-
tion of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."' 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1994).
21. Brief for Petitioners at 4, Strate (No. 95-1872).
22. A-I Contractors, No. 95-1872, 1992 WL 696330, at 1.
23. Id. at 5.
24. A-I Contractors v. Strate, No. 92-3359, 1994 WL 666051, at 2 (8th Cir. Nov. 29, 1994) rev'd
en banc, 76 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 1995). See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 435 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "de
novo trial" as "trying a matter anew; the same as if it had not been heard before and as if no decision
had been previously rendered.)"
25. A-I Contractors, No. 95-1872, 1992 WL 696330, at 4 (citing Duncan Energy Co. v. Three
Affiliated Tribes, 27 F.3d 1294, 1300 (8th Cir. 1994)).
26. The panel affirmed in a two-to-one decision with Circuit Judge Hansen dissenting.
27. A-I Contractors, No. 95-1872, 1994 WL 666051, at 4.
28. Id. at 3.
29. Id. at 5.
30. Id. at 7.
31. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, SUPRA NOTE 24, AT 526-7 (defining "en banc": "In the United
States, the Circuit Courts of Appeal usually sit in panels of judges but for important cases may expand
the bench to a larger number, when they are said to be sitting en banc").
32. A-I Contractors v. Strate, 76 F.3d 930 (1996).
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tana was the controlling law for the disposition of the case. 33 In Mon-
tana, the United States Supreme Court opined that Tribal jurisdiction
over non-tribal members was possible in only two situations: "1) when
nonmembers 'enter into consensual relationships with the [T]ribe or its
members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrange-
ments'; or 2) when a nonmember's 'conduct threatens or has some
direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the
health or welfare of the [T]ribe."' 34 These are known as the Montana
exceptions which, according to the United States Supreme Court, must be
met prior to a Tribe asserting jurisdiction over non-tribal members. 35
The Eighth Circuit then turned to the facts of the tort action to
determine whether a tribal interest under one of the two exceptions
would permit Tribal Court jurisdiction over Mrs. Fredericks, Lyle
Stockert, and A-1 Contractors. 36 Turning to the facts of the tort action,
the Court of Appeals ruled that there was no consensual relationship
between the Tribe and A-1 Contractors relevant to the car accident
because Mrs. Fredericks was a nonmember, that there was no tribal
interest at stake, and that the car accident did not affect the Tribe to any
significant degree. 37 Therefore, the Montana exceptions were not met
and, according to the Eighth Circuit, the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction
over the tort action between Mrs. Fredericks, Lyle Stockert, and A-i
Contractors. 38 In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Circuit Judge
Beam agreed with the majority that a 'tribal interest' was necessary for
Tribal Court jurisdiction. 39 However, he disagreed with the majority's
failure to find such a tribal interest in the tort action before the Eighth
Circuit.40 Instead, he chose to utilize the 'infringement test' and deter-
mined that in the instant case, if the state were to assert civil jurisdiction,
there would be an infringement upon the right of tribal self-government
which would violate the federal policies of tribal self-determination. 41
A dissenting opinion, authored by Circuit Judge Gibson,4 2 focused
on the narrow reading given by the majority as to the inherent sover-
eignty of Tribal nations.4 3 The threat posed by nonmembers "who
33. Id. at 934.
34. Id. at 935 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981)) (citations omitted).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 940.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 941.
39. Id. at 941-44.
40. Id. at 941. Circuit Judge Beam's opinion was joined by Judges Gibson, McMillian, and
Murphy. Id.
41. Id. at 944.
42. Id. Circuit Judge Gibson's dissenting opinion was joined by Judges McMillian, Beam, and
Murphy. Id.
43. Id. at 944.
1998] 715
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happen to wreak havoc on tribal land" should be within the powers of
the Tribe as one of "the most basic and indispensable manifestations of
sovereign power." 44 The final dissenting opinion was authored by Cir-
cuit Judge McMillian and joined by Judges Gibson, Beam, and
Murphy. 45 In this dissent, the presumption that Tribes affirmatively have
inherent sovereignty absent a limitation by treaty or federal statute was
found to be the basis for civil jurisdiction over the tort action.4 6 The
Montana case was distinguished on its facts as only precluding Tribal
jurisdiction over the regulation of non-Indians on fee lands.4 7 Finally,
assuming that Montana was applicable, the car collision fell within the
exceptions as involving an important safety issue for the Tribe.48 Upon
the petition of Gisela Fredericks and interested parties, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari and ordered an expedited briefing
schedule to review the Eighth Circuit's en banc ruling.4 9 Justice Gins-
burg authored the unanimous decision of the Court, affirming the
Eighth Circuit's ruling that the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction over the
tort action because of the failure to identify a tribal interest as required
by the Montana decision. 50
C. LEGAL BACKGROUND: MONTANA, NATIONAL FARMERS UNION, AND
IOWA MUTUAL
The issue of Tribal jurisdiction over Tribal lands has been conten-
tious since the arrival of Europeans in North America. 51 With the advent
of the treaty-making process, some rules were set down to govern the
issue of jurisdiction between Tribes and the United States. 52 However,
these rules were neither uniform nor generally well-known by settlers
entering Tribal lands or by the Tribes accustomed to their own forms of
justice, punishment, and remedies based on a case-by-case analysis. 53
With the imposition of reservation life, the Tribes were subjected to
United States military governance usually through an agency office with-
44. Id.
45. Id. at 945.
46. Id. at 946 (citing to Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987)).
47. Id. at 947.
48. Id. at 950.
49. Brief for Respondent at 3, Strate (No. 95-1872).
50. Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
51. See SHARON O'BRIEN, AMERICAN INDiAN T"IBAL GOVERNMENTS 296-97 (1989) (detailing the ex-
perience of Tribes as having to "deal with a federal government that has waffled between its commit-
ment to honor its treaty obligations to respect Indian lands and sovereignty and its desire to assimilate
the [T]ribes and obtain their lands and resources").
52. See VINE DELORIA JR. &CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 3-6 (1983).
53. Id. at 111-13 (discussing the traditional tribal justice systems).
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in the reservation and a nearby fort always prepared to descend upon the
reservation inhabitants. 54
In 1934, with the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act, Tribes
were forced to develop and adopt Bureau of Indian Affairs-modeled
constitutions which were to serve as the instruments by which reservation
life would be regulated.55 Under these models, the Tribes sought to re-
build their systems of law and order on the reservations and therefore,
the emergence of Tribal Courts 56 began based on the Bureau of Indian
Affairs' Courts of Indian Offenses. 57 Since 1934, Tribes have been
rebuilding their justice systems through this foreign, English common
law-based model and thus, asserting their jurisdiction once more over
Tribal lands. 58 It is through this history that the line of United States
Supreme Court cases concerning Tribal jurisdiction must be read to
accurately address the reality of Tribal Nations.
The three primary cases that are focused on throughout the Strate v.
A-I Contractors case history are: Montana v. United States,59 National
Farmers Union v. Crow Tribe;60 and Iowa Mutual v. LaPlante.6 1 Each
will be examined in turn for their relevance to the issues raised in the car
collision occurring on the Fort Berthold Reservation.
1. United States Supreme Court Decision in Montana v.
United States
In Montana v. United States, the Crow Tribe sought a declaratory
judgment that it retain regulatory authority over hunting and fishing on
fee land owned by non-Indians within its reservation boundaries based
54. See VINE DELORIA JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, THE NATIONS WITHIN 31 (1984) (commenting on
the agents use of chosen tribal members to justify judicial and governmental actions).
55. Id. at 171-82 (giving an overview of the process by which the Bureau of Indian Affairs
developed model constitutions for Tribes).
56. See Joseph A. Myers and Elbridge Coochise, Development of Tribal Courts: Past, Present,
and Future, JUDICATURE, Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 147, 148. "A clear trend since the Indian Reorganization
Act has been for [T]ribes to develop codes and convert from [Code of Federal Regulations] courts to
tribal courts operating under tribal sovereignty." Id.
57. See FRANK POMMERSHIEM, BRAID OF FEATHERS 61-66 (1995) (illustrating the role of the Courts
of Indian Offenses as extensions of the Bureau of Indian Affairs).
58. See Douglas B. Endreson, The Challenges Facing Tribal Courts Today, JUDICATURE, Nov.-
Dec. 1995, at 142. "It is difficult to overstate the difference between the challenge Indian [T]ribes
now face and those they faced for most of their more than 200-year relationship with the United
States. From the treaty-making period, to the era of Indian removal, to the allotment policy and the
horrors of the termination policy of the 1950s, Indian leaders battled to preserve tribal existence and to
maintain the land and natural resource base necessary to sustain Indian culture. Throughout this
struggle the [Tiribes were on the defensive--their lands, their resources, and their rights were always
at risk." Id.
59. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
60. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
61. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
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on its ownership of the Big Horn River's bed and banks.62 The United
States Supreme Court held that the Crow Tribe did not remain the owner
of the Big Horn River's bed and banks. This decision was based on
English common law principles with the conclusion that the river's bed
and banks were reserved by the United States federal government in trust
for the future state of Montana. 63 The United States was a party to the
action to seek declaratory judgment on behalf of the Crow Tribe and in
support of the Tribe's ownership of the riverbed and banks. 64
The Court's opinion set forth the reasoning that the 1851 and 1868
Treaties with the Crow Tribe should be construed pursuant to common
law principles, rather than the doctrine of deference to the understanding
of the Tribe at the time of signing the Treaty. 65 The Court also stated
that because the United States government held an easement in the Big
Horn River for navigability, it followed that the treaties with the Crow
Tribe could not be literally interpreted to provide absolute exclusion by
the Tribe within the Tribal territory. 66 Further, the Court stated that the
Crow people ate mostly buffalo,67 and therefore, having access to the
river to fish was not significant to the Tribe.68 After concluding that title
to the Big Horn River's bed and banks passed from the United States to
Montana when that state established itself, the Court found that the Crow
Tribe could not exercise regulatory authority over non-Indians on fee
land within the boundaries of its reservation. 69
The Court relied upon the 'Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe decision 70
which held that Tribal Courts' lacked jurisdiction over non-Indians with-
in reservation boundaries. 7 1 Based on this pronouncement, the Court
opined that "the principles upon which [the Oliphant decision] relied
support the general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an
Indian [T]ribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the
[T]ribe." 72 Piecing together various prior Court decisions, the opinion
62. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 547 (1981).
63. Id. at 554.
64. Id. at 549.
65. Cf. id. at 554 (applying common law principles to the facts of the case).
66. Id. at 555.
67. Id. at 556.
68. Id. It is interesting to note that the diets of Native people are relevant to the foundation of
property rights according to the United States Supreme Court. But see Justice Blackmun's dissenting
opinion stating that: "the factual premise upon which the Court bases its conclusion is open to serious
question: while the District Court found that fish were not 'a central part of the Crow diet,' there was
evidence at trial that the Crow ate fish both as a supplement to their buffalo diet and as a substitute for
meat in time of scarcity." Id. at 571 (citation omitted).
69. Id. at 564-65.
70. 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (opinion authored by Justice Rehnquist, presently Chief Justice of the
United States Supreme Court).
71. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
72. Id.
[VOL. 74:711
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formulated the now oft-repeated language redefining the 'inherent
sovereignty' of Tribal nations as perceived by that Court:
To be sure, Indian [T]ribes retain inherent sovereign power to
exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on
their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A [T]ribe
may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the
activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships
with the [T]ribe or its members, through commercial dealing,
contracts, leases, or other arrangements. A [T]ribe may also
retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the con-
duct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when
that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
[T]ribe.73
Applying this pronouncement, the Court found that it was unable to
fathom the affect of non-Indian hunting and fishing along the Big Horn
River within the reservation boundaries on the Tribe's political, econom-
ic, or social structure. 74 It therefore, held that the Crow Tribe was limited
to regulating non-Indians within the reservation boundaries on parcels of
land in the Tribe's possession or held in trust by the United States
government for the Tribe.75
2. United States Supreme Court Decision in National Farmers
Union
In National Farmers Union v. Crow Tribe,76 a child of the Crow
Tribe was struck and injured by a motorcyclist in the parking lot of the
Lodge Grass Elementary School parking lot, a public school located with-
in the boundaries of the Crow Reservation. 77 His guardian filed a civil
action in Crow Tribal Court for medical expenses and pain and suffering
against the school district and consequently, their insurer, National
Farmers Union. 78 The defendants to the civil action failed to appear in
Tribal Court, although they were served adequate notice, and a default
judgment was entered for plaintiff. 79 The defendant insurance company
and school district then filed a complaint in federal district court to
73. Id. at 565-66 (citations omitted).
74. Id. at 566.
75. Id. at 566-67.
76. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
77. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 847 (1985).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 847-48.
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enjoin enforcement of the default judgment. 80 The district court granted
a temporary restraining order and when that expired, a permanent
injunction was issued against the Tribal Court's enforcement of the
default judgment.8 1 To issue the permanent injunction, the district court
determined both that: 1) as a federal court, it had jurisdiction over the
matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331;82 and 2) that the Tribal Court
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the complained of tort and
therefore, over the default judgment as well. 83
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, a divided panel found that the dis-
trict court could not support its exercise of jurisdiction on any "constitu-
tional, statutory, or common law ground." 84 The United States Supreme
Court found federal jurisdiction over a Tribal Court through the fol-
lowing circular argument:
The question whether an Indian [T]ribe retains the power to
compel a non-Indian property owner to submit to the civil
jurisdiction of a [T]ribal [C]ourt is one that must be answered
by reference to federal law and is a 'federal question' under §
1331. Because petitioners contend that federal law has divested
the [T]ribe of this aspect of sovereignty, it is a federal law on
which they rely as a basis for the asserted right of freedom
from [T]ribal Court interference. They have, therefore, filed
an action 'arising under' federal law within the meaning of §
1331.85
In essence, the Court is stating that because the petitioner's claim
that federal law limits Tribal law, there is federal court jurisdiction. 86 An
assertion of petitioner, the insurance company, does not establish federal
court jurisdiction; rather, every court must satisfy itself as to its basis for
jurisdiction determined by either the Constitution of the United States or
through federal statute in every case as a fundamental matter of law in
the United States. 87 And nowhere in the Constitution or in federal law is
the jurisdiction of Tribal Courts expressly or impliedly said to arise from
80. Id. at 848.
81. Id.
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994). Section 1331 provides in relevant part: "Federal question. The dis-
trict courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States." Id.
83. National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 848-49.
84. Id. at 849.
85. Id. at 852-53.
86. Id.
87. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.1, at 249 (2d ed. 1994) (stating that:
"federal court jurisdiction cannot be gained by consent of the parties .... Accordingly, parties cannot
bring matters to federal court where constitutional or statutory authority is lacking. Therefore, consent
is never adequate to permit federal jurisdiction where none otherwise would exist").
720 [VOL. 74:711
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the separate sovereign of the United States of America. 88 The tort action
at issue was created under Crow Tribal law and neither implicates federal
law nor involves state law. 89
However, the United States Supreme Court did find federal subject
matter jurisdiction in the lower federal district court based on the petition-
ers' assertion that federal law preempted Tribal Court jurisdiction and
that this was therefore, an issue arising under federal law. 90 The Court
went on to expound the Oliphant decision which held that Tribal Courts
lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians within reservation boun-
daries. 91 Ultimately, Oliphant was distinguished as not applicable to the
civil jurisdiction of Tribal Courts. 92 Relying on the Congressional policy
of tribal self-government and self-determination, the Court created the
'exhaustion of tribal remedies' rule.93 Until all Tribal Court remedies,
including appellate procedures, have been exhausted, federal courts are
directed to restrain assertion of federal jurisdiction.94 In the final analy-
sis, the United States Supreme Court seriously encroached upon Tribal
Court jurisdiction with the National Farmers Union decision by finding
Tribal Court decisions reviewable in federal court when one of the
parties is non-Indian, with the slight delay of exhausting all available
Tribal Court remedies. 95
3. United States Supreme Court Decision in Iowa Mutual
In Iowa Mutual v. LaPlante, a member of the Blackfeet Tribe,
Edward LaPlante, brought suit in Tribal Court against his employer,
Wellman Ranch, located on the Blackfeet Reservation. 96 While driving a
company truck, the plaintiff was injured. In Tribal Court, the insurance
company for the Wellman Ranch, Iowa Mutual, sought to dismiss the
complaint on two grounds: 1) that the jurisdiction for the Tribal Court
was not properly alleged; and 2) that the Tribal Court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction. 97 The Tribal Court ruled that it did have subject-
88. See generally U.S. CONSTYUTION.
89. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 87, § 5.2 at 273-74 (stating that: "the current law concerning
when cases arise under federal law for purposes of § 1331 can be summarized by the following
principle: A case arises under federal law if it is apparent from the face of the plaintiff's complaint
either that the plaintiff's cause of action was created by federal law or if the plaintiffs cause of
action is based on state law, that a federal law that creates a cause of action is an essential component
of the plaintiff's claim").
90. National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 853.
91. Id. at 853-55.
92. Id. at 855.
93. Id. at 856,
94. Id. at 857.
95. Id.
96. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
97. Id. at 12.
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matter jurisdiction over "the conduct of non-Indians engaged in com-
mercial relations with Indians on the reservation." 98
In response, the insurance company filed in federal district court
asserting diversity jurisdiction99 under 28 U.S.C. § 1332,100 and seeking
declaratory relief that the injuries sustained by LaPlante fell outside
of the insurance company's policy coverage. 101 LaPlante filed a motion
to dismiss the action in federal court. 102 The district court granted
LaPlante's motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction
for the federal court. 103 The Ninth Circuit on appeal affirmed the dis-
trict court's order that the Tribal Court first determine its jurisdiction
over the action. 104 The United States Supreme Court then ruled that the
full appellate process had not been satisfied in accordance with Tribal
Court proceedings and therefore, federal jurisdiction was premature. 105
The Court stated that exhaustion of Tribal Court remedies was as neces-
sary in diversity of citizenship cases as in federal question cases, which
begs the question of where the original jurisdiction for reviewing Tribal
Court decisions stems from in the first place.106 The Court correctly
noted the historical exclusion of Tribes from federal diversity juris-
diction:
The diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, makes no reference to
Indians and nothing in the legislative history suggests any
98. Id.
99. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 24, at 477 (defining "diversity of citizenship [juris-
diction]" as: "A phrase used with reference to the jurisdiction of the federal courts, which under U.S.
Const. Art. II, § 2, extends to cases between citizens of different states, designating the condition
existing when the party on one side of a lawsuit is a citizen of another state, or between a citizen of a
state and an alien").
100. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), (d) (1994). § 1332 provides in relevant part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter
in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and
is between:
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are
additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in § 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and citizens of a State
or of different States.
(d) The word 'States,' as used in this section, includes the Territories, the District of
Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
101. LaPlante, 480 U.S. at 12-13. It is unclear whether Iowa Mutual was asserting that LaPlante
was either: 1) a citizen of another state; or 2) an alien. However, either assertion would be patently
false as LaPlante would be categorized as a Tribal member outside the scope of these two
classifications for diversity jurisdiction.
102. Id. at 13.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 13-14.
105. Id. at 17, (following the rule set forth in National Farmers' Union, 471 U.S. 845, 857 (1985)).
106. Id.
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intent to render inoperative the established federal policy pro-
moting tribal self government. Tribal courts in the Anglo-
American mold were virtually unknown in 1789 when Con-
gress first authorized diversity jurisdiction, see Judiciary Act of
1789, § 11, 1 Stat. 78-79; and the original statute did not mani-
fest a congressional intent to limit tribal sovereignty. More-
over, until the late 19th century, most Indians were neither
considered citizens of the states in which their reservation was
located, nor regarded as citizens of a foreign state, so a suit to
which Indians were parties would not have satisfied the statuto-
ry requirements for diversity jurisdiction. 107
The Court went on to note that Congress has amended the diversity
statute and has never attempted to limit Tribal Court civil jurisdiction on
the basis of that statute. 108 After this analysis, the Court then contradicts
the previous statements as to the applicability of diversity jurisdiction
over Tribal members by simply stating that the Tribal Court's "determi-
nation of tribal jurisdiction is ultimately subject to review." 109 The case
was remanded for proceedings in Tribal Court prior to an assertion of
federal review. 110 It appears that the Iowa Mutual decision expands the
United States federal courts' encroachment into Tribal Court jurisdiction
by adding diversity jurisdiction as a grounds of federal review, as well as
the federal question jurisdiction imposed in the National Farmers Union
decision.I
II. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT RULING: STRATE V. A-]
CONTRACTORS
A. MONTANA AS THE PATHMARKING CASE FOR TRIAL COURT
JURISDICTION
The decision opens with the statement that Tribes retain limited
sovereignty over nonmembers and cites to the criminal jurisdiction deci-
sion of Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, where the Supreme Court held that
Tribes completely lacked jurisdiction over nonmembers for criminal
offenses.ll 2 Building on the Oliphant decision, the Court explained that
107. Id. at 17-18 (citations omitted).
108. Id. at 18.
109. Id. at 19.
110. Id. at20.
111. It should be noted that based on these two opinions, the United States judiciary is requiring
Tribal plaintiffs in Tribal Court to undergo full trial and appellate proceedings, and then the same
process through the federal courts to sustain civil actions against non-Indians; nowhere else is this
amount of litigation required of a tort plaintiff.
112. Strate v. A-I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404(1997).
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Montana v. United States was decided three years later, and should be
considered "the pathmarking case concerning civil authority over
nonmembers."i1 3 In the Montana decision, the issue before the Court
was whether the Crow Tribe could regulate hunting and fishing within
the reservation boundaries by nonmembers on fee land owned by
nonmembers. 114 The Court held that the Tribe could regulate nonmem-
bers on land owned by the Tribe or held in trust for the Tribe, but could
not regulate nonmembers on fee land owned by nonmembers within the
boundaries of the reservation.11 5 The proposition that Montana sup-
ports, according to Justice Ginsburg speaking for the Court in Strate, is
that the Tribe's inherent sovereignty does not extend to jurisdiction
"over tribal nonmembers absent an express provision by treaty or
statute." 116 The Court recognized two exceptions that will dictate Tribal
Court jurisdiction.117
Montana thus described a general rule that, absent a different
congressional direction, Indian tribes lack civil authority over the con-
duct of nonmembers on non-Indian land within a reservation, subject to
two exceptions: The first exception relates to nonmembers who enter
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members; the second con-
cerns activity that directly affects the tribe's political integrity, economic
security, health, or welfare. 118 After setting out the tenets of the Mon-
tana case and its exceptions, the opinion focused on the Court's reinter-
pretation of two of its other decisions: National Farmers' Union and
Iowa Mutual, as not inconsistent with the Montana holding.119
B. RECONCILING NATIONAL FARMERS' UNION AND IOWA MUTUAL WITH
MONTANA
The Strate opinion focused on the holdings in National Farmers'
Union and Iowa Mutual as merely describing an exhaustion rule and not
as recognizing Tribal Court adjudicatory jurisdiction. 120 The Court
stated that its holding in National Farmers' Union centered on the
question of whether or not the Tribal Court had exceeded its jurisdiction.
As a matter of federal law, the Court decided the scope of Tribal Court
jurisdiction was within the federal judiciary's powers of review.121 In
113. Id.
114. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 547 (1981).
115. Strate, 117 S. Ct. at 1409-10.
116. Id. at 1409.
117. Id. at 1409-10.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1410.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1411.
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painstaking detail, the Court noted that National Farmers' Union's
recognition of greater civil than criminal Tribal Court jurisdiction over
nonmembers was not inconsistent with its interpretation of Montana as
requiring Congressional authorization in statute or treaty for Tribal
Court jurisdiction over nonmembers. 122 In conclusion, the National
Farmers' Union decision was discovered to be no more than a
procedural step in which Tribal Court's explain their jurisdictional
analysis for the parties to an action at the Tribal Court's door.123
Next, the Court in Strate reassessed the Iowa Mutual decision and
found that it embodied a prudent rule of allowing Tribal Court's to first
address actions brought into that forum. 124 The tribal exhaustion rule
was not characterized as jurisdictional, but rather prudential as a matter
of comity and 'respect.'125 Drawing on the citations to Colville,126
Fisher,127 and Montana decisions in the Iowa Mutual decision, the Court
bolsters its assessment of Iowa Mutual as standing for "the
unremarkable proposition that, where [T]ribes possess authority to
regulate the activities of nonmembers, 'civil jurisdiction over [disputes
arising out of] such activities presumptively lies in the [T]ribal
[C]ourts."1 28 To ensure conformity, the Court then expressly reiterated
its statement that National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual announce a
prudential rule of comity and thus, do not affect Montana's proposition
that Tribal Court's lack civil jurisdiction over nonmembers unless one of
two exceptions are met. 129 The Court enunciated its rule based on the
Montana decision that "as to nonmembers, we hold, a tribe's adjudica-
tive jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction."130 In a final
comment, the Court stated that Tribal Court jurisdiction in general does
not extend to the activities of nonmembers unless authority is found in
treaties, statutes, or through one of the two Montana exceptions.131
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1412.
125. Id.
126. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152-53
(1980) (citing to the language: "The power to tax transactions occurring on trust lands and signifi-
cantly involving a [T]ribe or its members is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty which the [T]ribes
retain unless divested of it by federal law or necessary implication of their dependent status").
127. See Fisher v. District Court of Sixteenth Judicial Dist. of Mont., 424 U.S. 382, 387-89 (1976)
(involving a child custody case where all parties concerned were tribal members and finding that the
Tribal Court had a substantial interest to adjudicate the case).
128. Strate, 117 S. Ct. at 1413 (citations omitted).
129. Id.
130. Id. This fails to address the obvious fact that the Three Affiliated Tribe's Tribal Code did
contain statutory language governing the Tribal Court's jurisdiction and laws pertaining to the tort
action at issue in the Fredericks' litigation.
131. Id. at 1413.
1998] 725
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
C. THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE EASEMENT WHERE THE COLLISION
OCCURRED
The Supreme Court then addressed the Tribal parties' contention
that Montana involved Tribal jurisdiction on nonmember land by non-
members, which was not true for the stretch of road on the Fort Berthold
Reservation.1 32 The Court patently settled the matter by stating that,
contrary to principles of property law, "[t]he right-of-way North Dakota
acquired for the State's highway renders the 6.59-mile stretch equiva-
lent, for nonmember governance purposes, to alienated, non-Indian
land."13 3 Finding support in unilateral acts of Congress which autho-
rized rights-of-way through Indian country, the Court concluded that
just compensation had been paid pursuant to federal statute to the Tribes
and therefore, all tribal interest had been extinguished.1 34 In addition,
the Court stated that because the Tribes had not reserved an interest in
the easement, the Tribes lost all landowner's rights by following the
federal procedures of giving consent for the easement. 135
D. REQUIRING THE TRIBES TO PROVE JURISDICTION THROUGH A
TREATY OR STATUTE
The opinion's final discussion faulted the Tribes for not providing
any documentation from the era of treaty-making that would authorize
jurisdiction for the purposes of tort law over nonmembers of the Tribes
on their newly formed reservation. 136 In the absence of such an express
treaty provision, the Court required authorization from Congress for the
Tribes to exercise the sovereign governmental function of judicial power
over tribal territory.137  Finding, for obvious reasons, that neither of
these novel requirements were met, the Court asserted that the fall-back
position would be the two exceptions mentioned in their Montana
decision to establish Tribal Court civil jurisdiction. 138
The first Montana exception would find Tribal Court jurisdiction
over the "activities of nonmembers who enter into consensual relation-
ships with the [T]ribe or its members, through commercial dealing,
contracts, leases, or other arrangements."1 39 Although A-1 Contractor's
sole reason for being on the reservation was for a business arrangement
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1414.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1414.
139. Id. at 1415 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981)).
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with the Tribes, the Court stated that this was not enough. 140 The Court
indicated that Mrs. Fredericks was not a party to the subcontract between
the Tribes and A-1 Contractors and therefore, the A-1 employee's
collision with her did not involve the type of consensual relationship
referred to in the Montana exception.141 The types of activities impli-
cated by the Montana exception were listed by the Court as Tribal juris-
diction over a sales transaction on the reservation, permit tax on livestock
owned by nonmember on the reservation, permit tax on nonmembers
doing business on the reservation, and taxing of cigarette sales to
nonmembers on the reservation. 142
The second Montana exception would find Tribal Court jurisdiction
when a nonmember's conduct "threatens or has some direct effect on
the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of
the [T]ribe."1 43 While the Court acknowledged that reckless driving
within the reservation could jeopardize the safety of Tribal members, it
foreclosed the exercise of public safety as an avenue for Tribal Court
jurisdiction over nonmembers under this second Montana exception.144
Rather, the Court listed two examples which were within the second
exception: 1) an adoption proceeding where all of the parties were
Tribal members; and 2) a merchant seeking payment for goods against
Tribal members.145 The Court relied on its previous cases dealing with
specifically state judicial intrusion as an example of infringing upon the
exercise of Tribal governments' 46
To further illustrate this point, the Court offered two cases in which
state judicial intrusion did not 'unduly' infringe on Tribal Court juris-
diction.' 4 7 Both cases upheld the taxing of nonmember livestock by a
state or territory when the livestock was on leased Tribal land, and found
that the tax did not interfere with the Tribes' tax-free status of property
under the United States Constitution.148 In the final analysis, the opinion
articulated the assertion that the second exception would only be
available when the state interfered with a Tribe's exercise of jurisdiction
over conduct which would endanger internal tribal relations or in a very
narrow sense Tribal self-government.149 In a footnote to this narrow
rule, the Court noted that "[w]hen, as in this case, it is plain that no
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. (citations omitted).
143. Id. (citing to Montana 450 U.S. at 566).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1415.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1415-16.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1416.
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federal grant provides for tribal governance of nonmembers' conduct
on land covered by Montana's main rule, it will be equally evident that
Tribal [C]ourts lack adjudicatory authority over disputes arising from
such conduct."150 The end result of the Strate decision based on the
above analysis was to deny Tribal Court jurisdiction over the vehicular
collision to Mrs. Fredericks because:
Opening the Tribal Court for her optional use is not necessary
to protect tribal self-government; and requiring A-1 and
Stockert to defend against this commonplace state highway
accident claim in an unfamiliar court is not crucial to the
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or
welfare of the [Three Affiliated Tribes].151 (emphasis added)
The Strate Court held in a unanimous opinion that the Tribal Court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the car collision within the bound-
aries of the Reservation. 152
III. CONFLICTING VIEWS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND COURT
JURISDICTION
The United States Supreme Court in the Strate decision takes the
view that inherent tribal sovereignty is somehow based upon or subject to
federal law.153 By examining the meaning of "inherent" and "sover-
eignty," a different conclusion is reached. An inherent power cannot be
divested, diminished or discarded. On the contrary, an inherent power
exists whether it is exercised or not, without any limitations, and for all
time.154 Sovereignty as legally defined is:
The supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which any
independent state is governed; supreme political authority; the
supreme will; paramount control of the constitution and frame
of Government and its administration; the self-sufficient source
of political power, from which all specific political powers are
derived; the international independence of a state, combined
with the right and power of regulating its internal affairs with-
out foreign dictation; also a political society, or state, which is
150. Id. at 1416 n.14.
151. Id. at 1416 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566(1981)).
152. Id.
153. See id. at 1409 (stating that the inherent powers of Tribes are somehow limited by Montana).
154. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 24, at 782 (defining "inherent powers" as: "An
authority possessed without its being derived from another. A right, ability, or faculty of doing a thing,
without receiving that right, ability, or faculty from another. Powers originating from the nature of
government or sovereignty, i.e., powers over and beyond those explicitly granted in the [United States]
Constitution or reasonably to be implied from express grants").
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sovereign and independent. The power to do everything in a
state without accountability, to make laws to execute and to
apply them, to impose and collect taxes and levy contributions,
to make war or peace, to form treaties of alliance or of com-
merce with foreign nations, and the like. 155
Inherent sovereignty cannot be subject to another nation or judicial
system. Inherent tribal sovereignty is thus, the absolute power of the
Tribes to be independent nations and to carry on their affairs without
accountability. The Tribes may enter into agreements with other nations
and bind themselves to those agreements for the benefit of both nations,
similar to, at least conceptually, the treaty-making era with the United
States and prior to that Great Britain and prior to that agreements
between the Tribes. 156 However, these agreements do not then subsume
the inherent sovereignty of the Tribes; rather the agreements logically
flow from the power of the Tribes to enter into them as sovereigns. 157
This is also true for the exercise of the Tribal Court system which is
an extension of the inherent sovereignty of Tribes. 158 The Tribal Court
system is necessary for the proper enforcement and adjudication of the
sovereign's laws. Any limitation upon the Tribal Court's authority must
be found within its own internal Tribal Code, long-arm statutes, and
prudential concerns. The Tribal Court systems have been forthright and
wise in their exercise of jurisdiction and have established the limits of
their authority as the limits of the tribal landbase. Upon entering a
reservation or tribal community, signs clearly indicate that the traveler
has entered the tribal landbase. This should serve as clear notice that the
traveler will become subject to Tribal Court jurisdiction based on enter-
ing the tribal landbase.159
155. Id. at 1396.
156. See Vine Deloria, Jr., Reserving to Themselves: Treaties and the Powers of Indian Tribes,
38 ARIz. L. REV. 963, 970 (1996). "Although the Constitution did not specifically identify the Indian
nations as political entities with whom the United States might treat, pressure from settlers on the
frontier and traders who dealt with Indians, as well as competition from England and Spain, made it
imperative that the new American nation recognize the Indians as capable of entering into diplomatic
relationships." Id.
157. See Daniel T. Campbell, The Courts, The Government, and Native Americans: The Politics
and Jurisprudence of Systematic Unfairness, 3 RACE & ETHNIC ANCESTRY L. DIG. 30, 41 (1997). "Ac-
cording to international law principles, there are four requirements for sovereign nation status: 1) the
entity must have a population, which the Native Americans obviously have as evidenced by their
heritage; 2) the entity must have a territory, which the Native Americans have in the form of
reservations; 3) the entity must have a structure of governance, which the Native Americans have in
the form of tribal councils; and 4) the entity must have the capacity to conduct relations with other
nations, which the Native Americans have proven through their negotiations with the U.S." Id.
158. See Ada Pecos Melton, Indigenous Justice Systems and Tribal Society, JUDICATURE, Nov.-
Dec. 1995, at 128. "The administration of justice, law, and order is a function of government retained
by the [T]ribes as sovereign nations." Id.
159. See Janelle King, Tribal Court General Civil Jurisdiction Over Actions Between Non-Indian
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The United States and its citizens are very comfortable with this
fundamental concept when they visit England, France, Spain, or Portu-
gal.160 However, there is an emphatic resistance to this fundamental
concept when they visit Indian country under the jurisdiction of Tribes.
The extent of this resistance is evidenced in Respondent's Brief for the
Strate decision. In Respondent's Brief, an attack is leveled against the
fair administration of justice in the Three Affiliated Tribes' Tribal Court
system without any basis for the horrors that are paraded in the guise of
legal argument.
This case presents serious issues for non-Indian citizens of
western states like North Dakota, who live in or travel across the
boundaries of Indian reservations, and potentially for Indians
who are not members of the [T]ribe occupying such reser-
vations. If non-Indians or nonmember Indians, for whatever
reasons, cross reservation lands on county, state, or federal
roads, under petitioners' construction of federal Indian law,
they run the risk of being forced into a tribal civil court within
a system of justice foreign to them. There, the risk of financial
and personal ruin without federally protected constitutional
due process or equal protection protections is very real.161
When a citizen of the United States travels to France, that citizen
cannot claim the protections of the United States Constitution in an
action in French Courts. The Three Affiliated Tribes, the United States,
and France are all constitution-based governments and it behooves a
traveler to become familiar with the laws of the jurisdiction where they
choose to enter. However, bias was not only present in Respondent's
Brief, it was apparent in the United States Supreme Court's final state-
ments in the Strate decision:
Gisela Fredericks may pursue her case against A-1 Contractors
and Stockert in the state forum open to all who sustain injuries
on North Dakota's highway. Opening the Tribal Court for her
Plaintiffs and Defendants: Strate v. A-I Contractors, 22 AMER. IND. L. REV. 191, 211-12 (1997).
Citizens of one state travel through other states frequently with the understanding that
such conduct makes them subject to that sovereign's laws. No distinction should arise
when such activity leads them into reservation boundaries. In the instant case, a sign had
been posted alerting travelers that they were entering that reservation. This should
function as sufficient notice for all concerned.
Id.
160. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Reconciling Federal and State Power Inside Indian Reserva-
tions with the Right of Tribal Self-Government and the Process of Self-Determination, 1995 UTAH L.
REV. 1105, 1109. "International law should be applied to the relationship between the United States
and the Indian [T]ribes. The only legal foundation for Congress' power to deal with Indian [T]ribes
outside the norms of international law is the doctrine of discovery which should have been repudiated
long ago." Id.
161. Brief for Respondent at 6, Strate (No. 95-1872).
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optional use is not necessary to protect self-government; and
requiring A-1 and Stockert to defend against this common-
place state highway accident claim in an unfamiliar court is not
crucial to "the political integrity, the economic security, or the
health or welfare of the [Three Affiliated Tribes]." 162 (empha-
sis added)
By furthering the 'unfamiliar court' argument, the United States
Supreme Court has driven a wedge between the tribal systems of justice
and their neighboring state's citizens.163 State citizens will not become
familiar with a court in which they do not enter, nor will state-licensed
attorneys. It seems patently unfair to argue that a court system is
unfamiliar and will always be unfamiliar. In essence, the United States
Supreme Court has sought to isolate the tribal systems of justice and
increase hostilities between tribal members and state citizens, each with
their own court system, which is fine until adispute arise between the
two. 164
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has recently autho-
rized itself and the federal court system review of the Tribal Court
systems.165 The sole basis for this authority is found according to the
federal courts in the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which grants federal
jurisdiction for issues arising under the laws, treaties, or constitution of
the United States. It defies logic that the Tribal Court systems have
arisen from federal law, rather the Tribes are inherently sovereign and
are not accountable to another sovereign.
Not only have the federal courts granted themselves the power to
review Tribal Court decisions based on the fiction of arising under fed-
eral law, but they have expanded that review to matters of diversity juris-
diction. In Iowa Mutual, the United States Supreme Court expressed its
opinion that after the exhaustion of Tribal Court jurisdiction, the dispute
162. Strate v. A-I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404, 1416 (1997) (citing Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544, 566 (1981)).
163. See Stanley G. Feldman & David L. Withey, Resolving State-Tribal Jurisdictional Dilemmas,
JUDICATURE, Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 156. "Effective state and tribal court communication and cooperation
is achievable. Although mutual respect, understanding, and cooperation cannot be legislated, much
can be accomplished by person-to-person communication and sharing information among tribal and
state judges and court staff." Id.
164. See Feldman & Withey, supra note 163, at 156. "State and tribal courts serve everyone in
the jurisdictions in which they operate, even though people traveling or doing business over jurisdic-
tional borders do not always recognize the legal significance of those borders until they become
involved in a crime or dispute." Id.
165. See Judith V. Royster, Stature and Scrutiny: Post-Exhaustion Review of Tribal Court Deci-
sions, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 241, 254 (1998). "As noted, the tribal exhaustion doctrine contemplates
some level of federal court review. Tribal [C]ourt decisions are thus not treated like state court
decisions in cases where federal courts abstain in favor of state courts." Id.
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could be brought to federal court upon diversity of citizenship
grounds. 166
Diversity of citizenship grounds may be theoretically more
consistent with the status of tribal members and state citizens. 167 How-
ever, the basic procedure of diversity cases is to apply the underlying
applicable state law to govern the case. 168 This appears to be a back
door attempt by the federal courts to: 1) review Tribal Court decisions,
which are the decisions of another sovereign; and 2) by applying a de
novo 169 standard, seeking to decide a case by applying state law or
reinterpret tribal law.170 The diversity of citizenship method of review-
ing a Tribal Court decision may therefore be a short cut from dismissing
the suit and requiring that the parties seek adjudication in state court. 17 1
By using diversity of citizenship, the federal court may apply state law
without requiring direct state court litigation. 172 Either way, the Tribal
Court system is being subordinated to both the federal and state courts
of the United States and this is contrary to the Tribes' inherent
sovereignty.173
166. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1997).
167. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 87, at § 5.3.3 (explaining that for a diversity action in federal
courts, there must be complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants, that each party
"must be a citizen of a state or a citizen only of a foreign country, and "a person may not sue or be
sued in a diversity case if he or she is a citizen of the United States, but not a citizen of a particular
state").
168. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 87, at § 5.3.5 (tracing the Erie doctrine as determining that
state law be applied in diversity jurisdiction cases befor the federal courts). "Although some of the
reasoning in the Erie decision has been questioned, its holding is widely accepted; in diversity cases,
federal courts are to apply state law, including state common law." Id.
169. See A-1 Contractors v. Strate, No. 92-3359, 1994 WL 666051, at 2 (8th Cir. Nov. 29, 1994)
(reviewing de novo the federal district court's dismissal of the suit brought by A-I Contractors and
Stockert for an injunction against the Three Affiliated Tribes' Tribal Court).
170. See Royster, supra note 167, at 280 (arguing that tribal law applies for diversity actions in
federal courts).
171. See Strate, 117 S. Ct. at 1409 n.4.
172. But see Royster, supra note 165, at 280 (stating that "[any diversity case raising a colorable
claim of tribal jurisdiction should be sent to [T]ribal [C]ourt for exhaustion of tribal remedies). In
[T]ribal [C]ourt, the merits will be determined according to tribal law, and on post-exhaustion review
the federal courts will be precluded from re-litigating those [T]ribal [C]ourt determinations of tribal
law"). Id.
173. See Laurie Reynolds, Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies: Extolling Tribal Sovereignty While Ex-
panding Federal Jurisdiction, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1089, 1135 (1995) (stating that "... the tribal exhaustion
rule has become a jurisdictional bootstrap, creating federal question jurisdiction for many disputes
previously found to be outside the purview of the federal courts").
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IV. PRAGMATIC RESULTS OF THE STRATE DECISION
With Tribal Court jurisdiction under direct challenge in the courts
of the United States, it may seem logical that the Tribes refrain from
adjudication within the courts of the United States. 174 However, it is
important to remember that once the parties to a Tribal Court dispute are
able to seek and acquire hearing in the federal system, the Tribe must
defend its jurisdiction and thus, become a party to a case before another
sovereign.175 The Strate decision originated in Tribal Court as a tort
claim, but it was through the aggression of the defendants that a suit
against the Tribal Court gained access to federal jurisdiction. 176  The
Tribal Courts face hostility from both aggressive defendants and the
neighboring state and federal judicial systems. 177  In response to this
situation, the Tribes are left in a kind of stand-off as they become aware
174. See Michael C. Blumm & Michael Cadigan, The Indian Court of Appeals: A Modest
Proposal to Eliminate Supreme Court Jurisdiction Over Indian Cases, 46 ARK. L. REV. 203, 214-15
(1993).
In addition to abandoning longstanding principles of federal Indian law, the Supreme
Court is a poor choice as ultimate decision-maker in Indian law matters because when-
ever the modem Court is faced with a case that implicates the interests of three sover-
eigns; a tribe, a state, and the federal government, the Court has proved institutionally
incapable of protecting tribal interests.
Id.
175. See Phillip Allen White, The Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine: "Just Stay on the Good Roads, and
You've Got Nothing to Worry About, " 22 AMER, IND. L. REV. 65, 65-66 (1997). "Indeed, if [T]ribes
were merely afforded a reasonable equivalent to the geographically-defined scope of subject matter
jurisdiction enjoyed by states, there would be no need for anything like an exhaustion doctrine.
Instead, we have a circumstance in which virtually any tribal controversy involving a non-Indian can
be, after some measure of appropriate procedures are followed, transformed into a federal dispute.
In those cases, the focus is not the parties and the dispute they must resolve. Rather, the focus be-
comes a frustrating argument between the [T]ribal [C]ourt, fervently guarding whatever it is that
remains of tribal sovereignty, and a non-Indian party, who argues just as zealously that such a thing as
tribal sovereignty has probably not existed since sometime in the fifteenth or sixteenth century." Id.
176. See Reynolds, supra note 173, at 1135-36. "It is difficult to argue that tribal sovereignty is
enhanced by [the tribal exhaustion rule] that treats the decisions of the [TIribe's highest judicial body
as open to re-litigation in the lower federal courts." Id.
177. See Getches, supra note 3, at 1594-95. "In at least seventeen decisions since 1980, the
Supreme Court has marked out the boundaries of Indian self-government, arguably pursuing its own
notion of what is desirable instead of being disciplined by established tests and rules. These cases
have ignored guidelines for construing treaties, which were designed, after all, to make reservations
permanent enclaves where Indians could exist relatively free of non-Indian control." Id.
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of the specific techniques the federal courts are employing to disregard
tribal sovereignty. 178
Central to the Strate decision was the legal status of the easement
within the reservation boundaries. Tribes were not aware that tacit con-
sent to the granting of rights-of-way for roads within the reservations
would lead to the federal courts finding a divesture of Tribal Court juris-
diction. But now that they are aware, the Tribes can alter future agree-
ments concerning rights-of-way.1 79 Unfortunately, this will leave the
Tribes in a permanent reactive stance as they await the next federal deci-
sion that encroaches upon Tribal Court jurisdiction to counteract its
specific effects.180 The Tribes must take a proactive stance and remind
the United States that as inherent sovereigns their jurisdiction is not open
to interpretation by the United States.181 As sovereigns, the Tribes and
the United states entered into formal treaties, so that peace would be pos-
sible between the Tribes and the immigrants who form the United States,
which the United States Supreme Court has conveniently disregarded.182
178. See White, supra note 175, at 169. "At worst Strate's inevitable chilling effect may mark
the beginning of the end for [T]ribal [C]ourts: while a plaintiff may have a sincere desire to bring
their action in [T]ribal [C]ourt, no reasonable person is going to seek unnecessarily protracted
jurisdictional disputes, the need for dual filings to protect a cause of action from expired State statutes
of limitation, and interminably delayed remedies." Id.
179. See Frank A. Demolli, A Pueblo's Response to Strate v. A-I Contractors, 14 T.M. COOLEY L.
REV. 541, 552 (1997) (describing the Pueblo of Pojaque's response to Strate as inserting into their
current and future right-of-way agreements with New Mexico the following clause: "The Pueblo of
Pojaque reserves civil jurisdiction and any applicable criminal jurisdiction over this right-of-way" and
describing that the proposed highway construction negotiations came to a "screaming halt").
180. See American Indian Law-Tribal Court Civil Jurisdiction-Ninth Circuit Holds that Black-
feet Tribal Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Tort Suit Arising on Reservation Between
Member and Non-member-Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997), 111 HARV. L. REV.
1620 (1998).
Recently in Wilson v. Marchington, the Ninth Circuit held that the Blackfeet Tribal Court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a tort suit arising from an auto accident involving
a registered tribal member and a nonmember on a highway within the reservation. In so
doing, the Ninth Circuit misinterpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Strate v. A-i
Contractors and seriously undervalued the [T]ribe's interest, which should have been
deemed sufficient to warrant a finding of subject matter jurisdiction.
Id.
181. See The Hon. Ada Deer, Tribal Sovereignty in the Twenty-First Century, 10 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 17, 18 (1997). "Along with the steady erosion of funds, the last two years have witnessed bold
and direct assaults on tribal sovereignty. We must continue our vigilance, such as protesting and
speaking out against situations .... " Id.
182. See Getches, supra note 3, at 1594-95.
[The United States Supreme Court] now gauges tribal sovereignty as a function of
changing conditions-demographic, social, political, and economic-and the expecta-
tions they create in the minds of affected non-Indians. In the emerging jurisprudence of
Indian law, the Court arrogates to itself the role of reviewing and weighing non-Indian
interests, and ultimately, of redesigning the sovereignty of Indian [T]ribes.
[VOL. 74:71 1
SOVEREIGN DOMAIN OF NATIVE NATIONS
The Tribes have sought to keep their word even in the face of
horrendous events and deceit. The Mandan leader, Four Bears, alive at
the establishment of the Fort Berthold Reservation, witnessed this deceit
and betrayal when the smallpox virus was intentionally introduced into
his community. His words reveal the level of betrayal that has been felt
by Tribes when the United States and its citizens have acted dishonor-
ably:
My Friends one and all, listen to what I have to say--ever since
I can remember, I have loved the whites. I have lived with them
since I was a boy, and to the best of my knowledge, I have
never wronged a white man. On the contrary, I have always
protected them from the insults of others which they cannot
deny. Four Bears never saw a white man hungry, but [t]hat he
gave him to eat, drink, and a buffalo skin to sleep on in time of
need. I was always ready to die for them which they cannot
deny. I have done everything that a [Native man] could do for
them, and how have they repaid it! With ingratitude! I have
never called a white man a dog, but today I do pronounce them
to be a set of black-hearted dogs, they have deceived me, them
that I have always considered as brothers, has turned out to be
my worst enemies. I have been in many battles, and often
wounded, but the wounds of my enemies I exalt in, but today I
am wounded, and by whom, by those same white dogs that I
have always considered and treated as brothers. I do not fear
death my friends. You know it, but to die with my face rotted
[from smallpox], that even the wolves will shrink with horror at
seeing me and say to themselves, that is Four Bears, the friend
of the whites-listen well that I have to say, as it will be the last
time you will hear me. Think of your wives, children, brothers,
sisters, friends, and in fact all that you hold dear, are all dead or
dying with their faces rotten, caused by those dogs the whites,
think of all that my friends, and rise all together and not leave
one of them alive. Four Bears will act his part. 183
Four Bears' words illustrate the many injustices that Tribes have
endured as they continue to foster a workable relationship with the
183. FRANcis CiARwN, C HARDON'S JOURNAL AT FORT CLARK 1830-1839 124-125 (Annie Heloise
Abel ed., 1932).
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United States. When the United States Supreme Court hands down an
opinion in direct contravention of the Tribes' inherent sovereignty, such
as the Strate decision, it is but one more injustice the Tribes endure in
keeping their end of the treaties. 184
184. See Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-Based and Membership-Based Views of Indian
Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme Court's Changing Vision, 55 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1, 96-97 (1993).
In rendering these [recent] decisions, the Court has treated tribal governments and their
authority in ways that would be inconceivable where the state and federal governments
are concerned, without any convincing reason for so doing .... These cases reveal the
Court's increasing unwillingness to respect tribal sovereignty, despite the principles
established in the Cherokee [Nation] Cases, solemn treaty promises and federal
programs aimed at supporting tribal governments. Recent decisions thus demonstrate the
Court's potential to do more damage to [T]ribes and the vitality of tribal governments
than the cavalry ever did.
Id.
